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3 Analyst Behaviour: the Geog-
raphy of Social Interaction
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence that an analyst working
in Germany is more likely to publish a high (low) price target regarding
a DAX30 stock when other Germany based analysts are also optimistic
(pessimistic) about the same stock. This e￿ect of geographical proximity
is not biased by the fact that DAX30 companies are headquartered in
Germany. Shedding light on how in￿uence takes place, I show that in-
￿uence through communication and the exchange of opinion within small
groups of analysts plays a vital role. This mainly applies during a bullish
market environment. When markets are bearish, analysts’ incentives in-
duce them not to deviate too much from the overall average, such that
then observational learning has a greater impact.
3.1 Introduction
On June 30th 2011, there have been roughly 42,000 actively traded stocks world
wide.1 Although ￿nancial markets are rather e￿cient regarding the availability
of information nowadays, this quantity of investment opportunities makes it
1This number has been published by the World Federation of Exchanges members on
www.world-exchanges.org and refers to the stocks that are traded on the 54 major stock
exchanges in the world. Double counting has tried to be eliminated by only considering
domestic stocks from the perspective of each stock exchange.
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impossible for market participants to access and elaborate every piece of infor-
mation. In this context, ￿nancial market analysts play a central role. Each of
them focuses on a few investment opportunities, uses his sector expertise and
tracking experience to provide forecasts of ￿nancial ￿gures and thereof derives
investment recommendations. The resulting impact analysts have on invest-
ment behaviour and market outcomes has led to a stream of literature that is
concerned with how analysts derive their forecasts and recommendations and
to what extend they are in￿uenced by other analysts.
Empirical works of Hong et al. (2000) and Krishnan et al. (2006) show that
equity sell-side analysts2 herd while providing earnings forecasts. Zitzewitz
(2001), Bernhardt et al. (2006) and Naujoks et al. (2009) ￿nd an anti-herding
behaviour in the same context. Kim and Zapatero (2009) and Jegadeesh and
Kim (2010) among others use analysts’ investment recommendation to provide
empirical evidence for herding behaviour.
All authors cited above assume that individual analysts are homogeneously in-
￿uenced by all other analysts. Only few authors have considered heterogeneous
in￿uence among analysts so far. Graham (1999) ￿nds that analysts are more
strongly in￿uenced by a lead analyst who is de￿ned by his reputation. Cooper
et al. (2001) consider several lead analysts who are determined by past per-
formance and market recognition. Welch (2000) postulates that an analyst’s
investment recommendation is in￿uenced by the consensus recommendation
and the two most recently published recommendations of other analysts.
With this paper, I contribute to the literature on heterogeneous in￿uence by
providing a detailed analysis of the geographical structure of social interaction
and relating it to the prevailing market environment. This represents a fur-
ther step into the direction of understanding how analysts deviate from their
own estimates and how analysts’ forecasts thus have to be interpreted in or-
2Hereafter, the term analyst always refers to an equity analyst. Due to empirical data
availability, the term analyst furthermore always refers to a sell-side analyst. See for instance
Groysberg et al. (2007) for a detailed comparative analysis between buy-side and sell-side
analysts.72
der to get valuable investment recommendations. My ￿rst hypothesis is that
analysts are more strongly in￿uenced by analysts that are geographically prox-
imate. The theoretical foundation for this hypothesis is derived from recent
evidence in the psychological literature. Reis et al. (2011) found that indi-
viduals are more strongly attracted by individuals with whom they are more
familiar. Translating this into the ￿nancial context, this means that forecasts
and recommendations of analysts working in the same country could appear
more reliable, as these analysts might be perceived to be more familiar due to
the same language or a similar background. Analysts who work in the same
city have a higher probability to know each other personally, which might am-
plify this e￿ect. The hypothesis of familiarity is also motivated by the evidence
that has already been provided in the context of portfolio selection (see e.g.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Huberman (2001)).
In the analyst literature, authors so far have always postulated that in￿uence
among analysts only takes place via ￿observation￿ (i.e. observational learn-
ing). It has mainly been argued that this is due to the fact that analysts work
for di￿erent ￿rms and thus are competitors. However, there are various theo-
retical settings that show that communication among competing participants
on ￿nancial markets can be bene￿cial (Eren and Ozsoylev, 2006, Stein, 2008,
Gray, 2010). The reason for this lies in the fact that through the exchange
of opinion, also known as word-of-mouth 3, information and potential research
advantage is not only given away. An analyst can also collect new pieces of
information and learns about other analysts’ views which helps to validate the
own results.4 Based on these theoretical considerations, my second hypothe-
sis is that analysts are more strongly in￿uenced by analysts with whom they
3I use the term ￿exchange of opinion￿ in order to emphasise that information is not only
transmitted, but also discussed.
4One could also think of the situation where information is only given away, however,
with the intention to in￿uence other analysts such that they skew their valuation results
into a desired direction, which makes the own already published result more credible for
investors.73
exchange their opinions. This hypothesis is related to the ￿rst one, because
the likelihood that two analysts know each other and exchange their opinions
is higher, if they are geographically proximate. Evidence in favour of this
hypothesis has already been provided in the context of institutional investors
(see e.g. Shiller and Pound (1989) and Hong et al. (2005)) as well as retail
investors (see e.g. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007)).
With my third hypothesis, I state that e￿ects of geographical proximity or the
exchange of opinion are more strongly pronounced during an economic upturn
compared to an economic downturn. I base this hypothesis on the incentive
structure of analysts who are judged by their relative performance ( Hong et al.,
2000, Hong and Kubik, 2003, Chen and Jiang, 2006). This means that in times
of a bull market they try to stand up from the crowd in order to distinguish
themselves from their competitors (Zwiebel, 1995). Therefore, they seek to
obtain research advantages from few other analysts who are familiar due to
geographical proximity or with whom they exchange their opinions. However,
during an economic downturn which generally induces a high uncertainty, they
try not to deviate too much from the overall average in order to limit the po-
tential loss (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Clarke and Subramanian, 2006).
My database consists of price targets regarding the stocks of DAX30 compa-
nies that have been published by sell-side analysts in the period from 2005 to
mid 2010. A price target refers to the value of a stock an analyst considers
to be fair and therefore expects to be reached by the market price within a
prede￿ned horizon that usually equals one year. Hence, price targets represent
investment recommendations and thus might have a direct impact on market
participants. In an empirical setting, the advantage of the price target com-
pared to the verbal investment recommendation (buy, hold, sell) lies in the fact
that it is a continuous variable that quanti￿es how optimistic or pessimistic
an analyst is about a stock. The choice of DAX30 stocks is motivated by
the high analyst coverage. Moreover, it allows the analysis of a homogenous
group of international analysts who have an indirect impact on one of the
major European indices. Such a focus has not been considered in the ana-74
lyst literature so far. The database is unique to the extent that it represents
a merger of the commonly used commercial database I/B/E/S provided by
Thomson Reuters and the data of analyst reports that are publicly available
on the webpage www.aktiencheck.de. While I/B/E/S is rather focussed on
analyst reports of great brokerage houses and investment banks, the reports
on www.aktiencheck.de include investment newsletters of research houses and
daily newspapers that also have in￿uence on market participants. The pe-
riod of the database allows a very up-to-date analysis of analysts’ behaviour
before and during the recent ￿nancial and economic crisis that has not been
conducted in the analyst literature yet. In order to examine the in￿uence that
results from the exchange of opinion, one has to identify the individual ana-
lysts who actually exchange their opinions with each other. In the context of
institutional investors, Hong et al. (2005) assume that the exchange of opinion
only or at least primarily takes place on the city level. In the context of retail
investors, Massa and Simonov (2005) state that there are further important
characteristics that indicate the exchange of opinion, namely the profession
and the former university attendance. In order to go beyond relying on as-
sumptions, I conducted a representative survey among DAX30 analysts to ￿nd
out with whom analysts actually exchange their opinions.
Within the empirical analysis, I ￿nd that when German analysts on average
increase their price targets by 1 EUR (1%), an individual German analyst
increases his price target by 0.32 EUR (0.15%) more than he does when an-
alysts working outside Germany on average increase their price targets by 1
EUR (1%). This corroborates the hypothesis of geographical proximity for
German analysts. I show that this result is not related to the fact that DAX30
companies are headquartered in Germany, which one might think to be an
informational advantage. Regarding the exchange of opinion, I discover that
before the economic crisis an individual analyst’s price target is more similar
to the price targets of analysts with whom he exchanges his opinion compared
to other analysts. Hence, my second hypothesis is a￿rmed at least for the
period before the economic crisis. It is not approved for the period during the75
economic crisis which in turn however is consistent with my third hypothesis
that analysts strongly align their price targets with the consensus and are less
in￿uenced by the exchange of opinion within small groups of analysts in times
of a great uncertainty which is generally given during a crisis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In chapter 3.2, I present
the dataset as well as the survey results. Chapter 3.3 serves to outline how
this data is used for the empirical analysis. The results are provided in chapter
3.4. An alternative explanation for these empirical results is o￿ered in chapter
3.5. Chapter 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Price Target Data
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the price targets regarding
the stocks of the thirty German companies included in the index DAX30 as of
May 31st 2010. In order to avoid confusions in the following, the term com-
pany shall always refer to the organisation having issued a stock, whereas ￿rm
denotes the organisation an analyst is employed by. The period of analysis
comprises the almost ￿ve and a half year time window from January 1 st 2005
to May 31st 2010 and thus includes the stock market peak preceding the ￿nan-
cial crisis in 2007/08 as well as the crisis itself. The price targets are primarily
extracted from I/B/E/S, the common database of analysts’ estimates provided
by Thomson Reuters. This yielded 10,972 values for the period of analysis.
Further price targets were collected from analyst reports being published on
www.aktiencheck.de5. For the same period of time 27,175 reports have been
evaluated and 16,821 price targets extracted. Both databases have then been
merged as follows. The I/B/E/S database has been used as a basis. Price
targets from analysts employed by ￿rms that are not included in I/B/E/S
5aktiencheck.de AG is an independent research ￿rm that collects analysts reports and
publishes them together with own reports on its webpage.76
have directly been added. For those ￿rms that appeared in both databases,
the publication dates regarding a speci￿c company have been compared. In
the case they were equal, only the I/B/E/S data has been taken. 6 Other-
wise, the price target from the analyst report on www.aktiencheck.de has been
added. In order to avoid double entries due to di￿ering publication dates, a
time window of plus minus ￿ve days has been applied. Thereby, a bu￿er of
ten days was generated cancelling out unreal price target updates. Moreover,
￿rms’ names instead of analysts’ names have been used for this comparison
in order to avoid double entries that result from the fact that two analysts
of a research team who published one common price target appear with one
analyst’s name in the ￿rst database and with the other analyst’s name in the
second. Note that data of I/B/E/S is adjusted by stock splits. As the analyst
reports published on www.aktiencheck.de represent the original reports as be-
ing published at the time, the extracted price targets also had to be adjusted
by stock splits to be consistent with the I/B/E/S data. The merger of both
databases yielded 25,534 price targets. Dropping all ￿rms that published less
than 30 price targets during the whole period of analysis reduced the number
of ￿rms by one half and led to a database of 24,893 price targets. The ￿nal
database resulted by eliminating all entries where only the ￿rm but not the
corresponding analyst was known and consists of 17,898 price targets. This
database is unique regarding to the following fact: While I/B/E/S primarily
contains estimates of investment banks, reports on www.aktiencheck.de also
comprise estimates from independent research ￿rms and investment letters.
The merger of both databases hence represents a broader spectrum of ana-
lysts’ price targets. Table 3.1 gives an overview of ￿rms included in the new
database. Moreover, the original database and the corresponding number of
price target publications are indicated.
In order to analyse the geographic structure of in￿uence, an analyst’s work-
6Ljungqvist et al. (2009) reported systematic errors in the historical I/B/E/S recommen-
dation database. The comparison of price targets that appear in both databases, however,
did not reveal remarkable deviations.77
Table 3.1: Table 3.1: Overview of the ￿rms included in the new price target
database
Firm I/B/E/S aktiencheck
ABN AMRO - 7
AC Research - 38
Actien-B￿rse - 82
Ahorro Corporaci￿n Financiera S.V., S.A. 17 -
Banc of America Securities-Merrill Lynch Research 3 302
Banco Sabadell 42 -
Bankhaus Lampe 104 198
Bankhaus Metzler 335 -
Barclays Capital 34 3
Bear Stearns 15 2
Berenberg Bank 46 -
BHF-BANK 359 28
Cheuvreux 595 222
Citigroup - 625
Collins Stewart 32 2
Commerzbank Corporates & Markets 268 196
Credit Suisse 219 169
Daiwa Securities SMBC Europe Limited 26 -
Der Aktion￿r - 189
Der Aktion￿rsbrief - 58
Deutsche Bank 269 139
Dexia Securities 5 37
DZ BANK 236 -
equinet AG 163 238
EURO am Sonntag - 172
Evolution Securities 31 -
Exane BNP Paribas - 84
FOCUS-MONEY - 59
Fox Pitt & Kelton 14 -
Frankfurter B￿rsenbrief - 84
Fuchsbriefe - 37
Goldman Sachs - 281
Helvea 43 20
HSBC - 106
HypoVereinsbank - 802
IIR Group 16 16
Independent Research - 1,507
ING 1 78
J.P. Morgan Securities - 324
Je￿eries & Co 52 7
Jyske Bank 44 22
Keefe Bruyette & Woods 36 9
Kepler Capital Markets 201 64
Landesbank Baden-W￿rttemberg 257 30
Lehman Brothers 53 25
LRP Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz 217 898
M.M. Warburg & CO 448 143
Macquarie 59 4
Merck Finck & Co. - 156
Morgan Stanley - 206
National-Bank AG - 159
Natixis Securities 143 -
Nomura Equity Research 171 19
Nord LB 112 583
Oddo Securities 117 -
Piper Ja￿ray 32 7
Prior B￿rse - 48
Raymond James 39 14
Sal. Oppenheim 665 108
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co 157 34
Santander 37 -
SEB - 1,171
SES Research 10 83
SociØtØ GØnØrale 235 374
SRH AlsterResearch 20 21
Stockstreet.de - 30
UBS - 261
UniCredit Markets & Investment Banking 374 516
WestLB 280 169
6,632 11,266
17,898
The table displays the ￿rms’ names and the number of published price targets originating
from the two di￿erent sources.78
ing location has to be known. Although the city is indicated on the analyst
reports on www.aktiencheck.de, the data could not be used as it usually only
referred to the headquarter of the particular ￿rm and not to the actual place
of work of an analyst. Hence, for each analyst in the database the city and the
corresponding country have been searched by hand on the internet. Table 3.2
shows the distribution of ￿rms, analysts and published price targets by coun-
try and city. Hereafter, an analyst’s nationality is used interchangeably with
the country where he works. This means for instance that a ￿German￿ analyst
refers to an analyst who works in Germany although there might be German
analysts who work abroad. Most of the ￿rms are Germany based, however,
closely followed by UK. London is the city where most of the analysts work and
is followed by Frankfurt where less than a half of London based analysts work.
German analysts published about 70% of all price targets. The portion of UK
based analysts who all work in London equals approximately 20%. Analysts
working in Frankfurt published about one third of all price targets.
3.2.2 Survey Evidence
In order to determine the in￿uence resulting from the exchange of opinion
among analysts, it has to be known which analysts exchange their opinions
with each other. Aiming to get this information, a survey of DAX30 analysts
has been conducted. In the period from June 15 th to July 8th 2010, all analysts
in the price target database have been contacted by email and asked to ￿ll in
a questionnaire. Out of 858 analysts in the database 718 could be reached 7
and 195 replied. This corresponds to a response rate of 27.2%, which ensures
the representativeness of the survey. The questionnaire consisting of eleven
questions is shown in table 3.3.
Concerning analysts’ interaction and reciprocal in￿uence from the exchange
7The remaining analysts could not be contacted, as they either left their ￿rm or because
no or not a valid email address could be found.79
Table 3.2: Table 3.2: Distribution of ￿rms, analysts and price targets of
DAX30 analysts by country and city
country city number of ￿rms number of analysts number of targets
Belgium Brussels 2 5 61
China Hong Kong 1 1 1
Denmark Silkeborg 1 5 66
Germany Berlin 1 1 37
Detmold 1 1 84
D￿sseldorf 6 34 815
Essen 1 5 159
Frankfurt 16 153 6,174
Hamburg 4 25 739
Hanover 1 17 695
Cologne 2 4 303
Kulmbach 1 1 189
Mainz 2 12 1,152
Munich 5 32 1,989
Stuttgart 1 24 250
Westerburg 1 3 38
France Paris 13 80 882
India Bangalore 1 1 3
Bombay 1 12 32
the Netherlands Amsterdam 3 5 44
Austria Vienna 1 1 9
Sweden Stockholm 1 1 1
Switzerland Geneva 1 2 27
Zurich 5 11 120
Spain Madrid 4 18 94
South Korea Seoul 1 1 22
UK London 33 388 3,781
USA New York 5 13 120
San Francisco 2 2 11
117 858 17,898
The table displays the number of di￿erent ￿rms, analysts and price targets on the country
and the city level. Please note that ￿rms that are based at di￿erent locations are double
counted. The same applies for analysts who changed their working location during the
period of analysis.80
Table 3.3: Table 3.3: Questionnaire of the survey
#1 How long have you been working at your ￿rm?
#2 In which city do you work?
#3 Where have you been employed before?
#4 Which university did you attend?
#5 With about how many analysts who cover at least one of the DAX30
companies covered by you, did you already have personal contact?
#6 In which way do you most likely have contact with other analysts
(e.g. telephone, meetings, events, lunch dates)?
#7 With how many analysts of question #5 do you exchange your
opinion regarding forecasts?
#8 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same country as you?
#9 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same city as you?
#10 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same ￿rm as you?
#11 How many analysts of question #7 attended the same university as you?
of opinions, the most important questions are #5 and #7 asking for the num-
ber of analysts, an analyst had already social contact with and an analyst
regularly exchanges forecast results with, respectively. The ￿gures 3.1 and
3.3 show the answers of these two questions. From the data, it can be seen
that social contacts are quite numerous. Only 14.0% answered not personally
knowing at least one other analyst who covers a common company. Additional
comments of the respondents con￿rm that there is a community of analysts
covering a stock wherein the members know each other and most often already
had a personal contact. Question #6 asking for the most regular way of con-
tact with other analysts provides the answer to this phenomenon. Analysts
meet frequently on events like investors’ days or analysts conferences and hence
communicate with each other often. The results of question #6 are shown in
￿gure 3.2.
Despite this regular contact, forecast results are not the main topic of con-
versation. Following question #7, only 34.6% 8 of the analysts exchange their
8The results of the question #7 to #9 and #11 are adjusted by the number of intra-
￿rm exchanges as being asked by question #10. This is done for two reasons. Analysts in
the same ￿rm act as one unity and only publish one result. Furthermore, the exchange of
opinion in a research team takes place by de￿nition and does not provide any insight.81
Figure 3.1: Figure 3.1: Histogram of the answers to survey question #5
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￿With about how many analysts who cover at least one of the DAX30 companies covered
by you, did you already have personal contact?￿
Figure 3.2: Figure 3.2: Histogram of the answers to survey question #6
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Events/Conferences Meetings Telephone Email Lunch date
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
answers
￿In which way do you most likely have contact with other analysts (e.g. telephone, meetings,
events, lunch dates)?￿82
Figure 3.3: Figure 3.3: Histogram of the answers to survey question #7
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￿With how many analysts of question #5 do you exchange your opinion regarding fore-
casts?￿
opinions regarding forecasts with at least one other analyst. Note that this
question is very delicate. Analysts in this context de￿ned as sell-side analysts 9
are competitors. Hence, no one is interested in giving away his research ad-
vantage or to reveal his ￿ndings. Formally, ￿rms’ policy even obliges analysts
not to do so. However, the fact that more than a third admitted to exchange
their results shows that there is an informal component that weights stronger
than policies or than obvious principles. As stated in the introduction, such
behaviour can be bene￿cial, because an analyst who exchanges his opinion
does not only loose a research advantage. Rather, he learns about other an-
9Some respondents annotated that from the formulation of the questions it is not per-
ceptible whether the word analyst refers to sell-side or buy-side analysts. Buy-side analysts
are sell-side analysts’ clients. Hence, the discussion of forecast results between these two
types of analysts is natural and not worth of analysis. The fact that 95% of the answers to
question #7 are below or equal to ￿ve proves that the questions have been understood as
being indented, if one assumes that number of sell-side analysts’ clients is usually greater
than ￿ve. As a precaution, the two answers above 15 have been taken o￿.83
alysts’ views which helps him to validate the own results. This is especially
relevant for the determination of price targets where also assumptions and val-
uation methods can be discussed without loosing a speci￿c research advantage
regarding an earnings forecast for instance. Indeed, some respondents who
denied the exchange of forecast results, as question #7 was formulated, anno-
tated that they nonetheless exchange assumptions and details about valuation
techniques. This suggests the actual number of analysts’ reciprocal in￿uence
from the exchange of opinions to be higher. Another fact that supports this
tendency is that because of the question’s delicate nature maybe not all an-
swers re￿ect the actual situation.
The basic intention of the survey was to determine with whom an analyst
exchanges his opinion. In order to get an acceptable feed-back ratio, no an-
alyst has been asked for the names of analysts with whom he exchanges his
opinion. Instead, I tried to reduce the universe of analysts that might be po-
tential counterparts for the exchange of opinion. This can among others be
done by using analysts’ working locations. If for instance an analyst does not
exchange his opinion with analysts working abroad, then all foreign analysts
can be excluded as potential counterparts for the exchange of opinion. Survey
questions #8 and #9 have been used in order to relate the exchange of opinion
among analysts to their working locations. Figure 3.4 displays the portion of
analysts from the same country or city, respectively, with whom a respondent
exchanges his opinion. On average, 82% of the analysts who exchange their
opinions regarding forecast results work in the same country (median: 100%).
This result corroborates the statement in the introduction that geographical
proximity (￿rst hypothesis) and analysts’ reciprocal exchange of opinion (sec-
ond hypothesis) are strongly related. This ￿nding is not biased by the fact that
all analysts work in the same country as only 56% of the respondents work in
the country where most of the respondents work (Germany). 10 Regarding the
city level, on average only 44% of the analysts that exchange forecast results
10The second and third most respondents come from the UK (22%) and France (10%).84
Figure 3.4: Figure 3.4: Histogram of the normalised answers to survey
questions #8 and #9
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￿How many analysts of question #7 work in the same country/city as you?￿ The answers
have been divided by the number of analysts with whom a respondent exchanges his opinion
regarding forecasts (see survey question #7). The left chart shows for instance that 30
analysts only exchange their opinion with other domestic analysts. Analysts who answered
not to exchange their opinions with any other analyst have been excluded.
work in the same city (median: 50%). This number is consistent with the an-
swers of question #6 where only 10% of the respondents answered to use lunch
dates as a regular way of having contact with other analysts. However, in the
two cities where with 26% and 22% most of the respondents work (Frankfurt
and London), this number lies at 65% and 78% respectively.
With Question #11 asking for the number of actual counterparts for the ex-
change of opinion who formerly attended the same university like the respon-
dent, it was intended to get another criterion to reduce the universe of poten-
tial counterparts for the exchange of opinion. I considered this characteristic
because it has been used in other empirical studies in the context of the ex-
change of opinion (see e.g. Massa and Simonov (2005) and Cohen et al. (2009)).
However, it turned out not to be adequate, because on average only 1% of the
respondents that exchange forecast results attended the same university (me-
dian: 0%).85
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Analysis of heterogeneous in￿uence by using di￿er-
ent reference groups
Within the empirical analysis of this paper, I do not determine the absolute
magnitude of in￿uence or whether analysts in￿uence each other at all. This
has already done in several prior studies (see e.g. Graham (1999), Hong et al.
(2000), Welch (2000), Cooper et al. (2001), Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt et al.
(2006), Krishnan et al. (2006), Kim and Zapatero (2009), Naujoks et al. (2009)
and Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)). Instead, I aim to analyse the structure of
in￿uence, i.e. an anlyst’s individual weighting of other analysts’ forecasts.
Therefore, I divide the analysts of the database into two reference groups.
The composition of these groups varies with the hypotheses to be contrasted.
In order to test the ￿rst hypothesis, for instance, one group consists of all
analysts who work in the same country while the other group is composed of
analysts who work in other countries. The resulting basic regression is given
by
Pict = αP
(g1)
ct + βP
(g2)
ct + ict, (3.1)
where Pict denotes the price target that is published by analyst i regarding
stock c at time t. P
(g1)
ct and P
(g2)
ct represent the average price targets of the
two di￿erent reference groups. The error term is given by ict. As not all
analysts publish their price target on the same day, t has to be understood as
a time window. In case the in￿uence among analysts was homogeneous, then
the coe￿cients α and β should not di￿er signi￿cantly.
The variables Pict, P
(g1)
ct and P
(g2)
ct represent time series of price targets. These
series could turn out to be non-stationary like in the case of stock prices. In
this situation, it has to be veri￿ed whether ict is stationary, such that the86
time series in equation 3.1 co-integrate (Engle and Granger, 1987). Otherwise,
empirical outcomes have a high risk to be spurious.
3.3.2 Composition of the reference groups
The construction of the two reference groups in order to contrast the e￿ect
of geographical proximity is straight forward, because the working locations
of all analysts are known. The determination of the e￿ect of the exchange of
opinion is somehow more challenging. The ￿rst group g1 has to be formed by
analysts who exchange their opinions with analyst i, while the second group
g2 has to contain only analysts who don’t. As stated above, I do not certainly
know which analyst has to be assigned to which group. A solution consists in
randomly assigning the analysts to the two groups. Obviously, without fur-
ther information, the probability of placing an analyst in the correct group
equals 50%. This means that if one considers a particular analyst A on the
left hand side of equation 3.1 and assumes that there are three other analysts
B, C, D who cover the same company (i.e. on the right hand side of equation
3.1), then the probability for a correct overall assignment equals 0.53 = 12.5%.
However, exploiting the survey evidence, this probability can be remarkably
increased. If for instance, analyst A answered to exchange his opinion with
two analysts who cover the same company, then taking randomly two out of
the three remaining analysts B, C, D, from the perspective of analyst A, yields
a probability of 100% to place at least one of the other analysts correctly and
a probability of 33% to assign all analysts to the correct groups. The latter
probability also increases to 100%, if one of these three analysts B, C, D an-
swered not to exchange his opinion with any other analyst. Figure 3.5 displays
the di￿erent constellations of this example.
Using real data from the survey, it is of course not possible to place all ana-
lysts correctly. However, aiming to contrast the in￿uence that results from the
exchange of opinion, it is not necessary reconstruct analysts’ underlying com-
munication network with a probability of 100%. Hereafter, I use the following87
Figure 3.5: Figure 3.5: Examplary use of the survey data for a random group
assignment
Situation I Situation II Situation III
group g1 group g2 analyst i
A B C D
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B D C
C D B
B D C
C D B
D C B
C D B
C D B
group g1 group g2 analyst i group g1 group g2 analyst i
A B C D
A
A
B D C
C D B
A B C D
8 possibilities: 12.5% 3 possibilities: 33.3% 1 possibility: 100%
Illustrating the example in the text regarding a random group assignment for the exchange
of opinion, the ￿gure shows the possibilities that arise, if one considers a particular analyst
A on the left hand side of equation 3.1 and randomly assigns three other analysts B, C, D
to the two groups on the right hand side of equation 3.1. All four analysts shall cover the
same company. In the ￿rst situation, one does not have any further information. In the
second situation, one knows that analyst A exchanges his opinion with two other analysts
that cover the same company. In the third situation, one additionally knows that analyst D
does not exchange his opinion with any other analyst.
null hypothesis h0 (not to be confused with the hypotheses one to three of
this paper): A counterpart for the exchange of opinion has a higher in￿uence
compared to other analysts and the in￿uence stemming from di￿erent coun-
terparts for the exchange of opinions is equal. Now, if one randomly assigns
the analysts to groups g1 and g2 while considering the information from the
survey, then under h0 the di￿erence α − β in equation 3.1 should turn out to
be positive, if there are enough analysts who are assigned to the right groups.
From the perspective of a particular analyst, the condition for placing enough
analysts correctly under h0 can be expressed as follows:
n
k
>
k − n
N − k
⇔ n >
k2
N
, (3.2)88
where N denotes the number of analysts who cover the same company and
thus could be potential counterparts for the exchange of opinion from the
perspective of a particular analyst. The number of analysts with whom a
particular analyst actually exchanges his opinion is given by k. While N is
determined by the database of price targets, the number k results from the
answers of the survey (see survey question #7). 11 The number of analysts
Figure 3.6: Figure 3.6: Notation for analysts’ group assignment
group g1 group g2
k N-k
n
The ￿gure displays an example of a random group assignment for the exchange of opinion.
Filled circles represent analysts that are actual counterparts for the exchange of opinion
from the perspective of a particular analyst. All other analysts are symbolised by empty
circles. Hence, ￿lled circles in the ￿rst group and empty circles in the second group stand
for randomly correctly assigned analysts.
that are randomly correctly assigned to group g1 is represented by n. Figure
3.6 serves to clarify the notation.
Aiming to exploit further survey results (see survey questions #8 and #9),
from the perspective of a particular analyst, the k analysts of group g1 can
be separated into k1 analysts who work in the same city, k2 analysts who do
not work in the same city but in the same country and k3 analysts who do
not work in the same country. N1, N2 and N3 stand for the corresponding
numbers of potential counterparts for the exchange of opinions. The resulting
11Using the answers from the survey, it is assumed that if two analysts exchange their
opinions then they do so regarding all companies they have in common.89
informational gain can be explained as follows. If for instance an analyst
answered not to exchange his opinion with foreign analysts, then from his
perspective all foreign analysts can be excluded for a random assignment to
group g1. For each analyst i, the probability that condition 3.2 is ful￿lled, i.e.
that there are enough analysts who are randomly correctly placed in groups
g1 and g2, such that under h0 one obtains α > β in equation 3.1, is given by
Pi(α > β|h0) = P(n >
k2
N
) =
Pk
m=b k2
N c+1
Q3
j=1
 kj
mj
 Nj−kj
kj−mj

Q3
j=1
 Nj
kj
 (3.3)
s.t. k =
3 X
j=1
kj
N =
3 X
j=1
Nj
m =
3 X
j=1
mj, mj ≤ kj.
In the following, the Bernoulli variable Ii takes the value one with a probability
of Pi(α > β|h0), if for a particular analyst i inequality 3.2 is ful￿lled and is
zero otherwise with a probability of 1 − Pi(α > β|h0). The overall probability
that the sign of α − β can be correctly estimated under h0 is given by
P(α > β|h0) =
 
X
i=1
wiIi > r
!
, (3.4)
where r is the percentage of observations in equation 3.1 for which inequality
3.2 has to be ful￿lled in order to estimate the right sign of the di￿erence
α−β. For the calculation of P(α > β|h0), r is set equal to 50%, ensuring that
inequality 3.2 is ful￿lled for the majority of analysts. As not every analyst
published the same number of price targets, the weighting coe￿cient wi has
been introduced.
In order to get an idea about the probability Pi(α > β|h0) that inequality
3.2 is ful￿lled for a particular analyst, table 3.4 provides the average values
of N1, N2 and N3 as well as of k1, k2 and k3 for the cities where at least one90
Table 3.4: Table 3.4: Overview of the analysts who regularly exchange their
opinions on DAX30 companies with other analysts
country city same city same country other countries exchange exchange country level exchange
ex same city city level ex city level other countries
N1 N2 N3 k1 k2 k3
Germany D￿sseldorf 3.5 36.5 42.0 2.0 0.0 2.8
Frankfurt 14.7 14.3 50.0 2.3 0.8 3.7
Hamburg 0.3 34.0 39.0 0.0 2.5 0.3
Mainz 0.0 23.0 37.0 0.0 7.0 1.0
Munich 1.3 29.3 33.3 0.3 1.3 0.6
Stuttgart 0.0 26.5 32.0 0.0 2.2 0.3
France Paris 3.0 0.0 44.7 0.7 0.0 1.3
Switzerland Zurich 3.0 0.0 37.0 2.0 0.0 3.0
UK London 14.0 0.0 43.7 1.3 0.0 1.7
overall 7.8 17.9 43.3 1.3 1.1 2.1
The ￿rst three columns of the table provide the average numbers of analysts in the same
city N1, the rest of same country N2 and abroad N3 who are theoretically available for the
exchange of opinion because they cover the same company at the same time. The second
three columns show the average numbers of actual counterparts for the exchange of opinions
in the same city k1, the rest of same country k2 and abroad k3 as obtained by the answers
of the survey.
analyst participated in the survey. Remember that the numbers of all potential
counterparts for the exchange of opinion, de￿ned by the coverage of the same
company, come from the price target database, whereas the numbers of actual
counterparts for the exchange of opinion are obtained by the survey. Summing
up the numbers in the second three columns of table 3.4 yields the size of group
g1, i.e. the total number of analysts with whom a particular analyst exchanges
his opinion irrespective of the working location. The size of the group g2 is
determined by subtracting this number of actual counterparts for the exchange
of opinion from the number of all potential counterparts for the exchange of
opinion, which is obtained by summing up the ￿rst three columns in table 3.4.
On average, the size of group g1 equals k = k1+k2+k3 = 1.3+1.1+2.1 = 4.5,
while the mean size of group g2 turns out to be N −k = (7.8+17.9+43.3)−
(1.3 + 1.1 + 2.1) = 64.5. Hence, from the perspective of a particular analyst,
the size of group g2 is generally much greater than the size of group g1. As I91
always consider group averages, the in￿uence of a singular analyst in group g2
is therefore very small. This means that if a counterpart for the exchange of
opinion is wrongly placed in group g2, his impact is diluted. Hence, under h0,
the estimated in￿uence of group g1 still might be higher than the estimated
in￿uence of group g2, such that the di￿erence α−β in equation 3.1 turns out
to be positive, if there are enough other analysts correctly placed in group g1.
Due to the group sizes, it is even su￿cient from the perspective of most of the
analysts that group g1 only contains one properly assigned analyst, in order
to ful￿l condition 3.2.
The overall probability P(α > β|h0) for estimating the correct sign of α−β in
equation 3.1 under h0 equals 73.3%. This means that running 1,000 simulations
of a random group assignment while taking the information from the survey
into account, the sign of the di￿erence α−β in equation 3.1 is expected to be
estimated correctly in 733 cases under h0.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Geographical proximity
With this paper, I intend to shed light on the structure of the in￿uence among
analysts. In this context, I test the relevance of geographical proximity, the
impact of the exchange of opinion and the temporal change induced by the
economic crisis starting in 2008. Testing di￿erent con￿gurations of the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test, all price target time series turn out to be stationary.
Hence, there is no risk of obtaining spurious results.
I start the analysis on the country level (see table 3.5). Therefore, the con-
struction of the relevant peer groups is straight forward as analysts’ working
locations are known from the price target database, such that additional infor-
mation from the survey is not yet needed. From the perspective of a particular
analyst, all other analysts covering the same company are divided into those
who work in the same country (group g1) and those who work in a di￿erent92
Table 3.5: Table 3.5: Regression results for the structure of in￿uence on the
country level
Pict P
(g1)
ct P
(g2)
ct α β const α − β N R2
(I) all domestic foreign 0.5600*** 0.4148*** 1.0081*** 0.1452*** 12,186 0.8734
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.2117) (0.0213)
(II) non German domestic foreign 0.3130*** 0.6868*** 0.8089*** -0.3738*** 3,946 0.9130
(0.0194) (0.0203) (0.3134) (0.0343)
(III) only German domestic foreign 0.6453*** 0.3250*** 1.0027*** 0.3203*** 8,240 0.8556
(0.0160) (0.0155) (0.2729) (0.0271)
(IV) only German domestic foreign 0.5853*** 0.3777*** 1.2923*** 0.2077*** 6,446 0.8306
without three largest German ￿rms (0.0191) (0.0184) (0.3342) (0.0322)
(V) only German domestic foreign 0.6658*** 0.3040*** 0.9453*** 0.3617*** 8,673 0.8616
time window of 45 days (0.0165) (0.0160) (0.2591) (0.0280)
(VI) only German domestic foreign 0.6189*** 0.3554*** 0.9324*** 0.2635*** 7,192 0.8404
time window of 15 days (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.3088) (0.0277)
(VII) only German domestic foreign 0.4361*** 0.2846*** 0.3230*** 0.1515*** 8,240 0.1421
normalised price targets (0.0175) (0.0208) (0.0251) (0.0299)
(VIII) non German German non German 0.5096*** 0.4754*** 1.3713*** 0.0343 3,991 0.9131
(0.0170) (0.0166) (0.3008) (0.0289)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 3.1 on the country level. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains domestic analysts, while group g2
is build of foreign analysts. This composition of the groups changes in speci￿cation VIII
where group g1 contains German analysts and group g2 is constructed by all other analysts.
Speci￿cation I includes all analysts. For speci￿cation II and VIII only analysts who work
outside Germany are considered on the left hand side of equation 3.1. Speci￿cation III-VII
only include Germany based analysts on the left hand side of equation 3.1 (group g2 still
contains foreign, i.e. non German analysts). A detailed description of the speci￿cations is
provided in the text. The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.93
country (group g2). As time window, I consider the thirty days period before
the publication of the price target of a particular analyst. This time window
is so designed that an analyst can only be in￿uenced by analysts whose price
targets were observable prior his own publication. The length of thirty days
guarantees that there are enough analysts to be included with their price tar-
gets, while the latter however are not too old. Estimating the coe￿cients of
equation 3.1 yields a signi￿cant di￿erence of 0.1452 (speci￿cation I). This re-
sult, however, might be biased by the fact that most of the price targets are
published by Germany based analysts. Indeed, considering only analysts work-
ing outside Germany on the left hand side of equation 3.1 leads to a negative
di￿erence of -0.3738 (speci￿cation II). This implies that the di￿erence for Ger-
man analysts is actually higher than estimated by the ￿rst regression. In fact,
this di￿erence equals 0.3203 (speci￿cation III). This means that an individ-
ual German analyst increases his price target by 0.32 EUR more when other
German analysts on average increase their price target by 1 EUR compared
to the same increase of price targets by analysts working outside Germany. In
order to provide some robustness checks for this result, several out-of sample
regressions have been run. First, the three German ￿rms that provided most
of the price targets are excluded. This still leads to a signi￿cant di￿erence of
0.2077 (speci￿cation IV). Next, the time window has been varied. Considering
a time window of 45 as well as 15 days prior the publication of a particular
analyst’s price target yields signi￿cant di￿erences of 0.3617 and 0.2635, respec-
tively (speci￿cation V and VI). Finally, I aim to suppress the bias of potential
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, I normalised price targets by the market price
of the corresponding stock on the day prior the publication. The resulting
di￿erence is signi￿cant and equals 0.1515 (speci￿cation VII). This means that
an individual German analyst increases his price target by 0.15% more when
other German analysts increase their price target by 1% compared to the same
proportional increase of price targets by analysts working outside Germany.
After having provided empirical evidence that the intra-country correlation of
price targets only applies for Germany based analysts, one might assume that94
this correlation is not due to the common country but is caused by the fact
that the companies of the examined stocks are also headquartered in Germany.
Therefore, German analysts might have or might at least be assumed to have
a better set of information such that foreign analysts are more strongly in-
￿uenced by German analysts than by their domestic colleagues. In order to
analyse the in￿uence that is generated by German analysts from the perspec-
tive of an analyst working outside Germany, I built up a group of analysts
that work in Germany (group g1) and a group of all other analysts (group
g2). The di￿erence between the estimated coe￿cients equals 0.0343 and turns
out to be insigni￿cant (speci￿cation VIII). Hence, an analyst who works out-
side Germany is not more strongly in￿uenced by German analysts than by
all other analysts. Nevertheless, a German analyst still might have a better
set of information although this is not recognised by analysts working out-
side Germany. I contrast this alternative hypothesis by comparing the returns
an investor would have realised, if he had followed the implicit investment
recommendations provided by price targets. The returns are given by
rict =

pc,t+365 + dct,t+365
pct
− 1

sgn(Pict − pct), (3.5)
where pct is the market price of stock c at time t and pc,t+365 is the stock
price one year there after. The dividends that are paid during the period are
given by dct,t+365. If an analyst publishes a price target that is higher than
the current market price, then he considers the stock to be under valuated
and implicitly recommends buying the stock. However, an analyst would not
necessarily recommend buying a stock when his price target is only little higher
than the prevailing stock price. Therefore, I use several thresholds for my
analysis. These are 1%, 3% and 5%. By including dividends in equation 3.5,
rict represents a gross return. For the comparative analysis of German and
non German analysts I consider gross as well as net returns, i.e. returns that
are calculated by including and excluding dividend payments. The results are
displayed in table 3.6. It can be seen that returns that result from the buy
and sell recommendations of German analysts are slightly higher. However,95
Table 3.6: Table 3.6: Average performance of German and non German
analysts
Germany not Germany di￿erence
gross return. threshold 1% 6.98% 6.11% 0.87%
(53.65%) (51.75%)
net return. threshold 1% 5.46% 4.43% 1.03%
(53.79%) (51.78%)
gross return. threshold 3% 7.18% 6.36% 0.81%
(54.28%) (52.39%)
net return. threshold 3% 5.62% 4.66% 0.97%
(54.38%) (52.38%)
gross return. threshold 5% 7.46% 6.62% 0.84%
(54.33%) (53.06%)
net return. threshold 5% 5.81% 4.89% 0.93%
(54.35%) (53.07%)
The table shows average hypothetical returns that result from German and non German
analysts’ implicit recommendation provided by their price targets. The di￿erent methods
of calculation are explained in the text. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.96
Table 3.7: Table 3.7: Regression results for the structure of in￿uence on the
city level
Pict P
(g1)
ct P
(g2)
ct α β const α − β N R2
(IX) all same city other city 0.3245*** 0.6576*** 0.7394*** -0.3330*** 10,329 0.8741
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.2332) (0.0256)
(X) non German same city other city 0.3155*** 0.6839*** 0.8180*** -0.3685*** 3,918 0.9123
(0.0195) (0.0203) (0.3145) (0.0343)
(XI) only German same city other city 0.3012*** 0.6702*** 0.6959** -0.3691*** 6,411 0.8510
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.3228) (0.0365)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 3.1 on the city level. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts who work in the same city,
while group g2 is build of analysts who work in di￿erent cities. Speci￿cation (IX) includes
all analysts. For Speci￿cation (X) only analysts who work outside Germany are considered
on the left hand side of equation 3.1. Speci￿cation (XI) only includes Germany based
analysts on the left hand side of equation 3.1 (group g2 still contains analysts working in
foreign cities). The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01). Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
none of the di￿erences are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. Therefore, I can
conclude that analysts working in Germany do not have better knowledge
about DAX30 companies although they are also headquartered in Germany.
This ￿nding is in line with Bae et al. (2008), who show that local information
advantage vanishes for large companies that operate globally and have a good
disclosure policy.
Now turning to the city level, from the perspective of a particular analyst, all
other analysts covering the same company are divided into those who work in
the same city (group g1) and those who work in a di￿erent city (group g2).
The resulting di￿erence equals -0.3330 (speci￿cation IX). Hence, analysts are
more strongly in￿uenced by analysts who work in di￿erent cities compared
to those who work in the same city. This result remains unchanged if only
analysts working outside Germany or only German analysts are considered on
the right hand side of equation 3.1 (speci￿cation X and XI). All regression
results based on the city level are shown in table 3.7.97
3.4.2 Exchange of opinion
Up to now, I considered the in￿uence stemming from analysts’ price targets
that could actually have been observed. In the following, I like to determine
the relevance of the exchange of opinion among analysts. Therefore, I enlarge
the time window to ±30 days. Hence, an analyst is considered to be also in￿u-
enced by analysts who published their price targets later in time. The intuition
behind is that analysts who exchange their opinions can in￿uence each other
without having to observe the ￿nally published price target.
In chapter 3.2, I explained that I do not certainly know an analyst’s coun-
terparts for the exchange of opinion. However, the data of the survey can be
used to get a good guess, if one randomly assigns the analysts to the group
of analysts who exchange their opinions with analyst i (group g1) and the
group of those who don’t (group g2). The regression equation 3.1 can only
be estimated, if the group g1 from the perspective of a particular analyst i is
non empty. This comes because there has to be at least one other analyst who
could have in￿uence on analyst i by the exchange of opinion, if the resulting
impact shall be estimated. In order to ensure this, I dropped all observation
where analysts (on the left hand side of equation 3.1) answered not to exchange
their opinion with any other analyst or did not participate in the survey at
all. Therefore, there are analysts whose price targets appear on the right hand
side of equation 3.1, but don’t on the left hand side.
Under the null hypothesis h0 that an analyst is more strongly (with equal in-
tensity) in￿uenced by those analysts with whom he exchanges his opinion, the
probability for correctly estimating the sign of the di￿erence α−β in equation
3.1 equals 73.3%. This value results, if the probability Pi(α > β|h0) at the
level of a single analyst is weighted by all price targets he has published during
the period of analysis. However, an analyst might publish a price target in a
period of time when no other analyst of those who are randomly assigned to
group g1 published a price target. In this case, the observation also has to be
dropped for the regression 3.1, because group g1 would be empty. Hence, the98
Table 3.8: Table 3.8: Regression results for the relevance of the exchange of
opinion
α β const α − β N P(α > β|h0) frel (α − β > 0)
0.4496 0.5465 0.8265 -0.0969 679 75.3% 43.0%
(0.3687) (0.3570) (1.6738) (0.7250)
The table provides the mean results of the simulation with 1,000 point estimates of the basic
regression 3.1 that is used to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts with whom he exchanges his
opinion, while group g2 is build of other analysts. P(α > β|h0) is the average probability
that for a random assignment of the groups the sign of the di￿erence α−β can be correctly
estimated under the null hypothesis. frel (α − β > 0) is the relative frequency of simulation
runs where the di￿erence α −β turned out to be positive. Standard deviations of the point
estimates resulting from the simulation runs are provided in parentheses.
number of price targets published by this particular analyst is reduced. This in
turn changes the weighting coe￿cients wi in equation 3.4, which thus depend
on the random composition of group g1 and g2. Therefore, the probability for
estimating the correct sign of α−β under h0 varies slightly. Table 3.8 provides
the results of 1,000 simulations. It can be seen that the mean probability for
a proper assignment equals 75.3%, which is slightly higher than using a na￿ve
weighting with all price targets published by an individual analyst. The av-
erage di￿erence α − β is negative and the point estimate of this di￿erence is
positive in only 43.0% of the cases. Given the fact that under h0, one would
expect α−β to be greater than zero in 75.3% of the cases, h0 has to be rejected.
Thus, I have to conclude that the exchange of opinion has no or at least less
relevance than observation.99
3.4.3 Social in￿uence in conjunction with the prevailing
￿nancial market environment
All afore presented results are obtained by using the whole database ranging
from the beginning of 2005 to mid 2010. This is a time period where ￿nancial
markets were subject to remarkable ￿uctuations. There was a bull market
until the beginning of 2007 when the U.S. subprime crisis began to develop to
a global ￿nancial crisis. The consequences for non ￿nancial companies arose
with the delay of one year, when the ￿nancial crisis became an economic crisis.
Most of the companies in the DAX30 are non ￿nancial companies, such that it
is of interest to examine changes in analysts’ behaviour before and during the
economic crisis. The beginning is marked by the collapse of the investment
bank Lehman brothers on September 15th 2008. This date is quite exactly
in the middle of the analysed period and thus allows separating the whole
database into two sets of data with similar number of observations. In the
following, I use these two temporal subsets in order to repeat the analyses on
the country and city level as well as regarding the exchange of opinion.
The results referring to the e￿ect of geographical proximity are shown in table
3.9. On the country level, I only consider German analysts, as prior results
showed that the relevance of the country only applies for analysts who work
in Germany. It can be seen that the di￿erence α − β is considerably greater
before the economic crisis than during it (speci￿cations XII and XIII). Before
the crisis, a German analyst increased his price target by 0.51 EUR more,
when other German analysts on average increased their price target by 1 EUR
compared to the same increase of the price target by other analysts. This
di￿erence is 0.34 EUR higher than during the crisis. On the city level, α − β
is negative before as well as during the crisis (speci￿cations XIV and XV).
However, this di￿erence is slightly greater, i.e. less negative before the crisis.
Table 3.10 shows the temporal di￿erences for the exchange of opinion. During
the economic crisis the mean di￿erence α − β is negative and only 33.9% of
the simulation runs yielded a positive di￿erence α − β. This is in line with100
Table 3.9: Table 3.9: Regression results for the temporal change on the
country and the city level
Pict P
(g1)
ct P
(g2)
ct α β const α − β N R2
(XII) only German domestic foreign 0.7414*** 0.2354*** 1.0673*** 0.5060*** 2,845 0.9372
before econmic crisis (0.0198) (0.0186) (0.3542) (0.0330)
(XIII) only German domestic foreign 0.5646*** 0.4000*** 0.9497** 0.1647*** 5,328 0.7665
during econmic crisis (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.3980) (0.0389)
(XIV) all same city other city 0.3498*** 0.6300*** 1.0152*** -0.2802*** 4,102 0.9376
before econmic crisis (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.2965) (0.0312)
(XV) all same city other city 0.3189*** 0.6658*** 0.5414 -0.3469*** 6,144 0.7874
during econmic crisis (0.0217) (0.0227) (0.3553) (0.0382)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 3.1 on the country and the city level.
In speci￿cation XII and XIII, only German analysts are considered on the left hand side
of equation 3.1. From the perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains domestic
analysts, while group g2 is build of foreign analysts. Speci￿cations XIV and XV are based
on all analysts. From the perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts who
work in the same city while group g2 is build of analysts who work in di￿erent cities. The
dataset is divided into two subsets with price targets being published before (speci￿cations
XII and XIV) and during the economic crisis (speci￿cations XIII and XV). The signi￿cance
of coe￿cients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Standard
deviations are provided in parentheses.101
Table 3.10: Table 3.10: Regression results for the temporal change of relevance
of exchange of opinion
α β const α − β N P(α > β|h0) frel (α − β > 0)
before economic crisis 0.5131 0.4173 4.2817 0.0958 262 63.4% 64.8%
(0.1701) (0.1737) (1.7417) (0.3425)
during economic crisis 0.4001 0.7015 -3.4232 -0.3014 415 78.7% 33.9%
(0.8471) (0.8189) (2.4488) (1.6647)
The table provides the mean results of the simulation with 1,000 point estimates of the
basic regression 3.1 that is used to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion.
From the perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts with whom he
exchanges his opinion, while group g2 is build of other analysts. The dataset is divided
into two subsets with price targets being published before and during the economic crisis.
P(α > β|h0) is the average probability that for a random assignment of the groups the sign of
the di￿erence α − β can be correctly estimated under the null hypothesis. frel (α − β > 0)
is the relative frequency of simulation runs where the di￿erence α − β turned out to be
positive. Standard deviations of the point estimates resulting from the simulation runs are
provided in parentheses.102
the previously obtained results by using the whole dataset. However, looking
at the period before the economic crisis, α − β turns out to be positive. The
corresponding probability for correctly estimating the sign of α − β under h0
equals 63.4%. The relative frequency of simulations runs where α is greater
than β turns out to be 64.8%. This indicates that the in￿uence from the ex-
change of opinion plays a considerable role for price targets published before
the economic crisis.
3.5 Alternative explanation
The afore-presented results corroborate the hypothesis of local proximity for
German analysts and the hypothesis that analysts are more strongly in￿uenced
by their counterparts for the exchange of opinion (at least before the economic
crisis). However, there might be an alternative explanation for these ￿ndings.
An often cited caveat in the literature of social interaction (see e.g. Manski
(1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Mo￿tt (2001) and Blume et al. (2010))
is that individuals only appear to be in￿uenced by peer group members. In
truth, their actions are correlated, because peer group members have similar
background characteristics that induce them to act analogously. For the ￿rst
hypothesis this would mean that price targets of German analysts are only
correlated, because all German analysts have for instance the same education
and therefore use the same method for the evaluation of the market environ-
ment. For the second hypothesis, this would imply that analysts exchange
their opinions with only those analysts who have a similar way of thinking
about investment opportunities, such that price targets are correlated without
any actual in￿uence taking place. There are several aspects that can be used
to argue against these alternative explanations. First of all, ￿nancial education
nowadays follows international standards. There are even uniform certi￿cates103
like the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 12. Therefore, it is not reasonable
to assume that German analysts use a di￿erent tool box compared to their
colleagues working outside Germany. Moreover, the structure of in￿uence has
been put in a temporal context. Hence, even if one does not trust the ab-
solute results, there is a signi￿cant di￿erence of behaviour before and during
the economic crisis. This especially applies for the in￿uence resulting from the
exchange of opinion. If one still does not want to believe in the explanations of
the structural patterns of in￿uence, then there is at least a clear indicator that
the in￿uence among analysts is not homogenous as many authors assumed in
their empirical studies.
3.6 Conclusion
The results can be summarised as follows. German DAX30 analysts are more
sensitive to price targets of other Germany based analysts than to price targets
published by analysts who work in other countries. This e￿ect is not due to
the fact that DAX30 companies are also headquartered in Germany. These
￿nding are consistent with the hypothesis of local familiarity. However, on the
city level no empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis could be provided.
Comparing the in￿uence of pure observational learning with the in￿uence that
results from the exchange of opinion, I cannot ￿nd relevance of the latter while
considering the whole period from 2005 to 2010. However, dividing the dataset
into two subsets with price targets before and during the economic crisis start-
ing in 2008 yields that before the crisis price targets of analysts who exchange
their opinions systematically di￿er from those who don’t. This tendency also
applies for the analysis on the country level. Before the economic crisis, a Ger-
man analyst is considerable more responsive to price targets of other German
analysts than during the crisis.
Putting the results into perspective, one can draw the following conclusion.
12See www.cfainstitute.org for more information.104
Before the economic crisis, analysts indented to di￿erentiate from their peers.
They tried to use research advantages provided by familiar analysts or those
analysts with whom they regularly exchange their opinions. During the crisis
in a time of great uncertainty, analysts were afraid of failing by providing es-
timates that were too far away from other analysts’ results. Therefore, they
rather aligned their price targets with the consensus such that the geographical
in￿uence and the in￿uence from the exchange of opinion were not or at least
less relevant.
On balance, I showed that the in￿uence among analysts is dynamic and not ho-
mogenous. Therefore, it is reasonable to use an adequate structure of in￿uence
for further research of analysts’ herding behaviour.105
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